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Abstract
Research conducted within the general paradigm of cognitive bias modification (CBM) reveals that emotional biases in attention,
interpretation, and memory are not merely associated with emotional disorders but contribute to them.After briefly describing
research on both emotional biases and their modification, the authors examine similarities between CBM paradigms and older
experimental paradigms used in research on learning and memory. The techniques and goals of CBM research are compared
with other approaches to understanding cognition–emotion interactions. From a functional perspective, the CBM tradition
reminds us to use experimental tools to evaluate assumptions about clinical phenomena and, more generally, about causal
relationships between cognitive processing and emotion.
Keywords
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Folk wisdom has it that some people see their glass as being
half full while for others it is half empty. In fact, it is true that
people vary in how they interpret ambiguous events and the
extent to which they attend to negative or positive information. We also know that these tendencies are associated with
susceptibility to emotional distress, such that those who are
prone to anxiety or depression are more likely than others to
interpret ambiguity in a negative way, attend more to emotionally negative cues, and selectively recall negative information
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Like people, animals also vary
in their responses to ambiguous events and, concordantly, in
their degree of emotional distress. In one study, dogs assessed
as being high or low in separation anxiety were trained to
expect to find food in a bowl placed in one location but not
when it was in another location. When the bowl was put in a
position intermediate between these two locations, dogs higher
in anxiety were less likely than others to investigate it, apparently assuming that it would be empty (Mendl et al., 2010; for
related findings with rats, see Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004).
Such results illustrate basic connections between emotion and
the way in which affectively relevant events are attended,
interpreted, and remembered, but until recently, the causal
nature of those connections has remained unclear.
This article briefly reviews experiments in the new tradition
of cognitive bias modification (CBM). This term (CBM) refers
to procedures designed to change particular styles of cognitive

processing that are thought to contribute to undesirable emotional reactions or disorders, using systematic practice in an
alternative processing style (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009).
CBM experiments have demonstrated that cognitive biases can
indeed be modified and that the induced changes influence subsequent emotional reactivity. The approach is not especially
novel; it simply involves applying basic principles of experimentation to discover the nature of the connections between
cognitive and affective tendencies: A variable believed to affect
the putative causal process is manipulated, and the effect on
an outcome measure is observed. There is a long tradition in
cognitive research of varying affective states—by way of a
musical manipulation, for example—to determine whether
mood influences some measure of subsequent cognition. In
contrast, CBM reverses the direction of cause under investigation to determine whether changes in cognition affect emotional
characteristics. The methods we describe are thus quite general
in their derivation and applicability and can be used to investigate a wide range of specific questions. Because they are so
general, our main purpose is to discuss similarities between
CBM paradigms and older, more traditional paradigms used in
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research on learning and memory, such as counterconditioning
and transfer-appropriate processing. We also discuss CBM in
relation to research on mood-congruent cognition and appraisal
theories of emotion. Through such comparisons we hope to
emphasize the fundamental principles at work in CBM and to
suggest directions for future work. But first things first: We
begin by briefly describing the nature of the cognitive biases
that have been linked to anxious and depressed states and then
turn to the methods that have been developed to modify such
biases as well as to the effects of those modifications on emotional reactivity.

Cognitive Biases in Emotional States
Attentional bias
Attention to affective information has commonly been
assessed by using designs in which the presence of task-irrelevant but affectively meaningful words or pictures can influence the latency of responses to an intended target. In the
emotional Stroop task, for example, naming the color in which
words are written tends to be slower when the content of such
words is emotionally negative or matches the current concerns
of the participant (reviewed by Williams, Mathews, &
MacLeod, 1996). More definitive evidence of attentional
biases has emerged for search tasks in which participants
respond to simple targets (e.g., arrows or letters) that appear in
the prior location of either an emotional or neutral cue (e.g.,
words such as disease versus cabinet) by pressing a key as
quickly as they can. When both emotionally negative and neutral cues are presented simultaneously and replaced a few hundred milliseconds later by a single target in one of the cued
locations, anxious individuals are typically faster to respond to
targets appearing in locations just vacated by threatening
rather than neutral cues, whereas nonanxious control participants show the reverse pattern (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata,
1986; meta-analysis by Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). These results
have been interpreted as indicating either greater engagement
of attention in the vicinity of threat cues by anxious participants, slower disengagement from threat cues, or both. When
a single threat cue is presented in one of two possible locations, anxious individuals are particularly slow to detect targets appearing in the other location, suggesting that they have
special difficulty in disengaging their attention from threat
(Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews,
2001). However, studies using endogenous cueing (e.g., neutral or fearful faces with gaze directed to left or right locations)
suggest that anxious individuals are both more likely to direct
their attention to locations of potential threat—such as toward
the direction of fearful gaze—and slower to disengage from
such locations (Fox, Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007;
Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003). This conclusion is
consistent with clinical observations that people with specific
fears orient their gaze toward the possible locations of the
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object of their fear, as when a person fearful of spiders constantly looks for any sign of spiders in likely hiding places so
as to be able to escape if necessary (Rinck, Kwakkenbos,
Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Becker, 2010).
Depressed individuals also show similar attentional biases,
although these biases seem to operate over a somewhat slower
time scale and (unsurprisingly) are directed at stimuli more
related to depression than fear (e.g., sad faces; Hankin, Gibb,
Abela, & Flory, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; but see
Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). In contrast, nondepressed
individuals are more likely to attend to positive stimuli. Overall, emotional stimuli tend to capture attention more than do
neutral ones, but whereas this tendency in healthy individuals
applies as much (and sometimes more) to positive as to negative cues, in those prone to anxiety or depression, attention is
more likely to be captured by negative cues, particularly when
such cues are related to individual emotional concerns.

Interpretation bias
Relative to nonanxious control groups, anxious individuals are
more likely to remember and report ambiguous events in terms
of their more threatening meanings. In one early study (Eysenck,
Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991), participants listened
to recorded sentences, some of which were ambiguous and
could be interpreted in either a threatening or benign manner
(e.g., the doctor measured little Emma’s growth). Subsequently,
they were asked to decide the extent to which related sentences
had the same meaning as the original sentences (e.g., the doctor
examined little Emma’s tumor versus the doctor charted little
Emma’s height). The key finding was that nonanxious controls
were more likely to endorse nonthreatening interpretations,
whereas currently anxious individuals were equally likely to
endorse threatening and nonthreatening interpretations. Similar
results have emerged from subsequent research. For example,
socially anxious and nonanxious participants read descriptions
of job interviews and at ambiguous points in the text (when the
outcome still remained unclear) were required to make speeded
lexical decisions about words related to possible inferences concerning negative or positive outcomes. Nonanxious individuals
were consistently faster to endorse words related to positive
inferences, whereas socially anxious individuals were equally
fast to endorse words matching positive and negative inferences
(Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; see also Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo,
1997; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Richards & French, 1992).
The critical finding in each of these experiments was an interaction revealing interpretation differences between anxious and
nonanxious groups, not an outcome indicating that one or the
other group was biased in the sense of departing from objective
outcome probabilities (that remain unknown). It is clear, however, that higher anxiety levels are associated with a relatively
greater tendency to perceive the more threatening meaning of
emotional ambiguity.
There is also evidence (albeit somewhat less consistent)
that depression is associated with negative interpretations of
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emotional ambiguity. Depression-related differences were not
obtained in an experiment that measured the time to name target words matching negative or benign inferences (Lawson &
MacLeod, 1999; also see Bisson & Sears, 2007). However,
clear differences did emerge in an experiment using startle
modulation to measure the resolution of ambiguity (Lawson,
MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). Another effort (Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006) failed to find depression-related differences in reading latencies but found such differences in a
spelling task involving the interpretation of spoken homophones (e.g., wore/war). Taken together, these results support
the contention of Lawson and MacLeod that depressionrelated differences in interpretation biases may be obscured in
reaction time tasks (due to general slowing in depression) but
emerge when interpretation is assessed in other ways.

Memory bias
Evidence of negative memory bias in depression has been well
established for many years (for reviews, see Mathews &
MacLeod, 2005; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). Whereas
nondepressed individuals are more likely to remember positive
self-descriptive words and happy faces, those prone to depression are relatively more likely to remember negative selfdescriptive words and sad faces. Moreover, recent experiments
provide evidence that attentional and interpretative biases in
depression influence the nature of what is remembered (Hertel
& El-Messidi, 2006; Koster, de Raedt, Leyman, & de Lissnyder,
2010; Wells, Beevers, Robison, & Ellis, 2010).
Evidence for anxiety-related biases on memory tests is
more mixed, due to some failures to find anxiety-related differences in the recall of threatening versus neutral words (see
reviews by MacLeod & Mathews, 2004; Mitte, 2008). The
failures have been attributed to ceiling effects (e.g., when
words are encoded in relation to the self; Russo et al., 2006)
and to the possibility that anxious individuals avoid threatening ideas as a means of emotion regulation (MacLeod &
Mathews, 2004). However, as is the case with depression, evidence for memory biases in anxiety is found when other cognitive characteristics of anxiety are taken into account (such as
imagery-based distortions in the recall of social scenarios;
Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008; see Hirsch,
Clark, & Mathews, 2006). Anxiety-related memory biases
also seem to depend on whether procedures allow for idiosyncratic elaborations. For example, selective recall tends to
emerge in experiments in which superficial encoding tasks
permit but do not require personally relevant elaboration
(MacLeod & Mathews, 2004).

In summary
Compared with the benign or positive processing style that
characterizes healthy people, those prone to anxiety and
depression are more likely to attend to negative or threatening
cues, resolve ambiguity in negative ways, and selectively

remember negative events. The critical issues addressed in the
work discussed next are whether these cognitive biases can be
established experimentally and thereby incur emotional consequences. A fundamental assumption underlying cognitive
therapy for emotional disorders and cognitive appraisal theories of emotion is that cognitive characteristics play a part in
creating emotional resilience or emotional vulnerability. CBM
procedures test this assumption.

Modifying Cognitive Biases
Good experimental control of a phenomenon is achieved if the
phenomenon can be simulated and then eliminated. This old
saw from the tradition of experimental psychology is made
more meaningful by the clinical goal of eliminating biases that
characterize emotional distress and disorders. Experiments in
the tradition of CBM started by simulating cognitive biases
and, in some domains of bias research, continued to the goal of
elimination. Unless otherwise specified, the experiments
described in the following sections were conducted with nonclinical volunteers; only when participants were selected for
special characteristics such as emotional vulnerability or clinical condition do we specify the basis for inclusion.

Attention training
In training experiments, tasks originally developed to measure
attention to emotional information are modified in a way
designed to promote either attention toward threatening cues
(such as words or pictures) or disengagement of attention from
them. In the method first described by MacLeod, Rutherford,
Campbell, Ebsworth, and Holker (2002), participants are
instructed to respond as fast as possible to a neutral target
(such as a dot), which is preceded by the display of two words,
one threatening and one benign, for 500 ms on either side of
fixation. In one group (attend threat), targets nearly always
follow in the location of the threat words, while in the other
(avoid threat), targets follow in the alternative location. Thus,
in the former group, performance is facilitated by attention to
the location of threat cues, whereas performance in the latter
group is aided by not attending threat cues. Noncontingent
probe trials show that attention is indeed deployed as intended,
with faster latencies when the target follows in the expected
location. However, the critical finding concerns differential
emotional responses to a posttraining task involving insoluble
problems. The attend-threat group reported more distress than
did those trained to avoid threat. In later studies, several sessions of similar training to attend to benign cues were found to
reduce reported emotional reactions to a real-life event (moving to another country; See, MacLeod & Bridle, 2009).
In another type of attention task, participants are required to
find a target picture in an array of distractors (e.g., a happy face
among neutral faces); results have indicated that angry faces can
be detected more rapidly than other expressions, especially by
socially anxious individuals (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir,
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1999; cf. Fox et al., 2000). Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, and Pruessner (2007) developed this method into a
training task by having participants search for one smiling face
in a matrix of 16 faces, with the other 15 having rejecting (negative) expressions. In contrast to a control condition in which
participants searched for flowers, repeated sessions of training
not only reduced rated work stress in telemarketers but also led
to lower cortisol levels, an index of emotional distress.
Attention training has also been shown to have beneficial
effects for participants suffering from clinical anxiety states,
such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder and social phobia (for a
meta-analysis, see Hakamata et al., 2010). Practice in responding to targets in the location of words with benign meanings or
smiling faces, rather than threatening words or faces, resulted
in greater reductions of clinical anxiety than did a control procedure in which targets were presented equally often in either
location (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Amir, Beard,
Taylor, et al., 2009; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano,
2009). The finding that most participants in both conditions
believed that they had been allocated to a control group,
despite substantial improvements in the active condition,
potentially argues against accounts based on experimental
demand (Amir, Beard, Taylor, et al., 2009), although it is possible that participants were aware of the training contingencies
while nevertheless believing that benign training serves as a
control for something more emotional. More impressive is the
evidence from formal mediation analysis that changes in attention to threat following training mediate the reduction of anxiety in response to stress (e.g., Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, &
Taylor, 2008; See et al., 2009).
In summary, repeated practice in avoiding attention to negative cues—such as threatening words or disapproving faces—
can reduce subsequent emotional reactions to potentially
stressful events, even in highly anxious individuals. The same
is true of practice in interpreting ambiguous events in a relatively benign manner.

Interpretation training
As with attention, interpretational style can be modified using
variations of tasks originally developed to assess biases in the
interpretation of emotionally ambiguous events. In one such
modification (of the method used by Eysenck et al., 1991),
participants are required to read and imagine ambiguous event
descriptions resolved only by the final word, presented as a
to-be-completed fragment (i.e., a word with letters missing).
For example:
You have decided to go caving even though you feel
nervous about being in an enclosed space. You get to the
caves before anyone else arrives. Going deep inside the
cave you realize you have completely lost your . . .
This description is followed by the to-be-completed fragment w_y (way, a negative outcome) or f_ar (fear, a positive
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outcome). Participants allocated to practice with either consistently negative or consistently positive resolutions have been
subsequently tested with new event descriptions that remain
ambiguous, and their interpretations assessed by the extent to
which the participants later endorsed either negative or positive statements as having the same meaning as the original
descriptions. Compared with the positive group, participants
allocated to practicing negative resolutions reported feeling
more anxious and made more negative interpretations of the
novel test descriptions (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Subsequent experiments showed that effects of training on interpretations persisted until the next day and influenced emotional
reactions to viewing videos of real-life accidents. Negatively
trained groups reported greater increases in distress than did
those who had practiced positive resolutions (Mackintosh,
Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006). More recent
experiments using similar methods have produced similar outcomes (e.g., Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010).
In an alternative method (used originally by Grey &
Mathews, 2000), single ambiguous words (homographs) are
followed by to-be-completed word fragments corresponding
to associates of the homographs’ threatening or benign meanings (e.g., sink followed by dro_n or wa_h). Evidence for the
modification of interpretation bias comes from two additional
studies using this method (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010a; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford,
2006). Responses to new test items matching the practiced
affective valence were faster than were responses to test items
matching the nontrained valence. Furthermore, viewing a subsequent video of accidents elicited more negative emotion in
those who had previously practiced accessing negative rather
than benign meanings.
As with attention, modifying interpretative style has been
shown to produce beneficial changes even in emotionally vulnerable groups. In participants complaining of excessive
worry, a single session of practice in selecting the benign
meaning of emotionally ambiguous words and descriptions
reduced later negative thought intrusions, in contrast to control
participants who accessed benign and threatening meanings
equally often (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). This reduction in worry was accompanied by simultaneous improvements on a working memory task, suggesting that changes
depended not on increased effort but on increased cognitive
control achieved by the reduction of worrying. In a related
clinical study, similar training reduced worry in patients suffering from Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Hayes, Hirsch,
Krebs, & Mathews, 2010).
Similar beneficial effects of interpretation training have
reduced elevated social anxiety (Beard & Amir, 2008). Participants saw either positive or negative words (such as funny or
embarrassing) followed by an ambiguous sentence (people
laugh at something you said) and were required to decide
whether the word and sentence were related. A positive trained
group was always given “correct” feedback when they
endorsed a positive word and “incorrect” feedback when they
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endorsed a negative word, whereas a control group was given
noncontingent feedback. Eight sessions of positive training
led to greater decreases on a questionnaire assessing social
anxiety than in the control group. Moreover, reductions in
social anxiety were partially mediated by the extent to which
endorsement of positive word–sentence pairs had increased on
a separate, noncontingent test of interpretation bias.
Adapted versions of interpretation training have also been
found to ameliorate or prevent depressed mood. In one version, participants were trained to make positive interpretations
with or without self-imagery, and only the imagery-based
training was effective in protecting against negative mood
(Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; see also Blackwell & Holmes,
2010). Another adaptation of CBM has been based on previous research showing that rumination (prolonged abstract
thinking about the reasons for one’s problems) serves to prolong depression; compared with a more abstract, ruminative
condition, a new concrete and experiential training condition
effectively reduced depressed mood (Watkins, Baeyens, &
Read, 2009). In summary, as with attention, practice in interpreting emotional ambiguity in a more positive (or negative)
manner influences how novel ambiguous exemplars are interpreted and can also reduce (or increase) negative emotional
states or the distress caused by stressful events.

Procedures for changing memory
Cognitive biases revealed on memory tests logically can be
produced by biases operating while initially encountering or
interpreting the event to be remembered later or by biases
operating at the time that memory is tested. Experiments performed to simulate memory biases therefore might involve
practice in performing procedures in which the bias is manipulated in any of those ways. Compared with other types of
CBM, however, only a few experiments have been performed
to establish biased memories, and these experiments mainly
have modified interpretation biases in ways that produce distorted memories.
One experiment trained interpretation biases with the procedures established by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) and
found that recall of new ambiguous scenarios presented after
training contained distortions that reflected the type of interpretations practiced during training (Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011). In other words, ambiguous statements were
remembered as having been nonambiguous in ways congruent
with training. A similar experiment simulated situations in
which interpretation biases are acquired following the events
to be recalled; recall of initial interpretations of the ambiguous
scenarios was distorted in line with the training condition
experienced subsequently (Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh,
2010). This outcome suggests that memory for one’s own
thoughts can be affected by a bias acquired at a later point.
Two additional experiments used the interpretation-training
paradigm combined with a test procedure designed to dissociate controlled and automatic influences on the memory test
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(Hertel, Vasquez, Benbow, & Hughes, in press; see Jacoby,
1991). These experiments presented a few “critical” scenarios—some resolved negatively and some positively—at the
end of a traditional training phase and followed them with a
test that produced estimates of controlled recollection of those
critical scenarios. The results revealed that experience with
benign training scenarios proactively interfered with the recollection of the negative resolutions. This outcome, found
with both low and high trait-anxious students, implies that
benign interpretation training might be used as a cognitive
vaccine against later negative memory biases (see Holmes
et al., 2009).
Another means of modifying memory is to reduce the probability of recalling certain kinds of experiences. The tendency
to remember and ruminate about negative experiences is worth
eliminating, because rumination exacerbates depressive states
(see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). In a
recent experiment designed to promote forgetting on a later
test, individuals with major depressive disorder and controls
were trained to suppress negative associates to repeatedly
encountered benign cues (Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009). Depressed participants achieved such forgetting but
only when thought substitutes had been used to aid suppression practice (unlike controls who could forget without these
aids). This outcome and the previously cited evidence of distorted memory for initial interpretations (Salemink, Hertel, &
Mackintosh, 2010) exemplify retroactive effects of practice
that modify memory for earlier events. Modifications can
therefore influence measures of memory by affecting retrieval
processes, not merely initial interpretations.
These five experiments on modifying memory failed to
find (or did not assess) evidence of any emotional consequences. However, another study did find that instructions for
intentional suppression practice protected against adverse
emotional reactions to a subsequent stressful task, compared
with a condition in which forgetting was achieved more passively (LeMoult, Hertel, & Joormann, 2010). More generally,
the modification of memory bias might be expected to have
emotional consequences, because previous experiments have
shown that instructions to recall positive autobiographical
memories can produce changes in mood states (e.g., Joormann
& Siemer, 2004). On the other hand, deliberate reflection on
the past is a state of mind that differs from the well-practiced,
fluent interpretation of ongoing events that characterizes CBM
and is potentially important in producing transfer to emotional
reactions during ensuing stress tasks. Perhaps other methods
of assessment will better reflect changes in emotion as a consequence of changes in memory.
Whether they are fueled by the pursuit of emotional consequences of memory modification or by other issues, experiments on the modification of memory are ripe for the making.
Such experiments can be designed either to alter the contents of
memory, to impair memory for the undesirable thought or event,
or to improve memory for the desirable thought or event. In the
latter regard, efforts to train attention and concentration (e.g.,
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MacLean et al., 2010) should also benefit subsequent remembering of emotionally benign events.

In summary
As with modification of attention to threat, practice in the positive resolution of ambiguity can transfer to new ambiguous
situations and lead to subsequent changes in affective reactivity to potentially emotional novel events. Similarly, biases
induced in interpretation can transfer to tests of memory for
the initial ambiguous events and their corresponding interpretations. The evidence discussed so far strongly suggests that
cognitive biases are malleable and that modifying them can
have consequences for memory and emotional vulnerability.
These conclusions appear to apply across a wide range of
conditions and age groups, from the use of interpretation training to reduce social anxiety in children as young as 10 to 11
(Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou, 2009) to the induction of decreased attention to negative pictures in 60- to
90-year-old adults (Isaacowitz & Choi, 2011). Similarly, the
methods have become increasingly varied as they have been
applied to different disorders. In one recent application, alcoholic patients were retrained to make avoidant movements to
alcohol-related pictures (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). Until we learn otherwise, we assume that the
same fundamental principles are likely to apply across a wide
range of specific applications.

Basic Mechanisms Underlying CBM
Unsurprisingly, the modification of cognitive biases relies on
tried and true principles of experimental psychology. Always
wary of reinventions, we now call attention to major correspondences between CBM paradigms and older functional
paradigms used in research on learning and memory. An
advantage in noticing these similarities, beyond parsimony, is
that connections to prior research encourage us to reconsider
findings from those domains as grist for investigations of
biases and their elimination.

Transfer-appropriate processing
CBM procedures are most certainly related to older experiments on transfer of learning, popular in the mid-twentieth
century (see Ellis, 1965), as well as more current approaches
to transfer in concept learning and problem solving (e.g.,
Nokes, 2009). Researchers such as Ellis wrote about near and
far transfer to represent the degree of overlap between training
and transfer tasks. Although the dimension of near to far transfer should be viewed as a continuum, most CBM experiments
are near-transfer experiments because, as illustrated in Figure
1, the situations presented and procedures invoked during
training are similar to those in the transfer phase. Some stressful transfer tasks (e.g., emotional response to viewing a video
of dangerous accidents; Wilson et al., 2006) can be thought of
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as far-transfer tasks; the same cognitive procedures are
assumed to be involved but the contexts differ substantially
from those presented during training.
Near-transfer tasks in CBM have been used to explore the
extent to which training in one type of attention or interpretation task generalizes to other tasks with similar processing
requirements. Practice in the interpretation of homographs by
completing word fragments thus generalizes to lexical decision speed in judging associates of ambiguous primes (Grey &
Mathews, 2000; Hoppitt et al., 2010a; Wilson et al., 2006);
practice in judging semantic similarity between such primes
and related (benign or negative) words generalizes somewhat
farther to the content of mental images cued by novel homographs (Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, & Kintner, 2003). Similarly, training via searching for a smiling face in a matrix of
negative expressions reduces interference from rejectionrelated words in a modified Stroop task (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004). Near-transfer effects can sometimes fail, however,
when the type of response required or the content domain differs across training and test (Salemink, van den Hout, et al.,
2010; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Far-transfer
effects occur in the critical experiments used to establish
causal links between cognitive processing bias and emotional
reactivity. In these experiments, training selective attention or
interpretation using simple word stimuli can influence later
emotional reaction to apparently very different experiences,
such as failing to solve difficult anagrams or viewing accident
videos (Mackintosh et al., 2006; MacLeod et al., 2002; Wilson
et al., 2006).
In the field of memory research, the concept of transfer has
proved to be useful across the decades and into this century,
mainly as a theoretical framework called transfer-appropriate
processing (TAP; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). The
initial experiments in the TAP framework revealed that performance on memory tests was facilitated when the cognitive
procedures invoked on the test replicated those at work during
initial encounters—for example, when conceptual cues for
recall, not perceptual cues, followed an initial semantic elaboration task.
TAP experiments have been performed in a variety of contexts for learning and testing. One of the more applicable
examples is found in a series of experiments on spontaneous
transfer in problem solving (Needham & Begg, 1991). At the
time of this work, few examples could be found of uninstructed
transfer of solutions to logic-based word problems. The training problems were typically taught as examples to be studied
and learned, whereas the transfer phase consisted of new problems to be solved. Good levels of transfer of solution methods
to new problems was obtained when participants were told
before the presentation of target problems to think back to
analogous prior problems but not when the analogies were left
implicit. This was a distressing state of affairs for applications
to education, and we note that a parallel exists in therapeutic
contexts. Just as the teacher is not present in later classes to
remind the student of analogies learned in her class, the
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Attention Training

Near Transfer

Far Transfer (Challenge)

Latency to Find A Smiling Face Latency to Identify Target
Rated Emotion Follows Attempt
Among Rejecting Faces.
Replacing Either a Negative or to Solve Anagrams While
Positive Face.
Viewing Disapproving Face.

Frmityscl?
Jurtonbsn?
Murdsati?

Interpretation Training
Latency to Complete Fragment
Related to the Threatening or
Benign Meaning of the JustPresented Homograph.

Growth

Near Transfer

Far Transfer (Stress)

Rated Mood Before and After a
Latency to Choose the More
Video of a Series of Actual
Related of two Words
Following a Homograph on the Accidents.
Previous Screen.

Stalk

T-mor

Plant Paint

Fig. 1. Examples of phases from an attention-training paradigm (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2009) and an interpretationtraining paradigm (Wilson et al., 2006). Training phases typically consist of 80–100 trials. The dependent measures are listed
in the table, and examples of computer displays are shown below each.

clinician is not present during real-world “tests” to remind the
client to think back to their sessions. By applying the TAP
framework, however, Needham and Begg invented the proper
training analog whereby participants were instructed not to
learn the training problems but instead to solve them; under
those conditions, spontaneous transfer to solving new problems was obtained. Conversely, studying the training problems with the goal of remembering them transferred well to
target solutions when participants were actually instructed to
remember specific training problems at the time of the test.
Interpretation training sessions in CBM experiments also
establish the conditions for spontaneous transfer. Far-transfer
effects following interpretation training depend on the active
selection of emotional meanings during training rather than
simple exposure to them. For example, emotional reactivity
differences have been observed after training in which participants resolved emotional meanings of ambiguous words or

texts for themselves but not when they read already disambiguated versions (Hoppitt et al. 2010a; Hoppitt, Mathews,
Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010b). Even larger effects would be
expected if CBM participants were gradually encouraged to
resolve training scenarios in the absence of fragments. More
generally, transfer in CBM experiments seems to be successful
to the extent that the training and transfer “problems” invoke
the same cognitive procedures. Successful transfer to later
emotional tasks thus depends on practice in actively selecting
emotional meanings during training because elicitation of
affect at test depends on similar active involvement. Nevertheless, even when this condition is met, far transfer to emotional
challenges is not always obtained (e.g., Salemink et al., 2007;
Teachman & Addison, 2008). A major goal for CBM researchers is to find ways to establish robust far-transfer effects in
order to sidestep the need for individualized training in stressful situations.
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Desirable difficulties

Associative learning

Another goal is to use modification procedures that last. One
sure way to promote better memory on delayed tests is to distribute practice across sessions instead of massing the same
amount of practice into one session (see Cepeda, Pashler, Vul,
Wixted, & Rohrer, 2006). In a transfer-appropriate fashion, having something come to mind after a period of not thinking about
it facilitates the same retrieval process on subsequent attempts.
In this regard, a few CBM experiments have taken advantage of
the benefits of distributed practice when using multiple training
sessions with clinical groups (e.g., Amir et al., 2009).
Distributed practice is one of several operations referred to
as a desirable difficulty by researchers who attempt to apply
memory principles in educational settings (Bjork, 1994). Students and instructors alike tend to prefer “easy” instructional
techniques that lead to rapid changes in performance (e.g.,
Kornell & Bjork, 2008); the benefits of practice are quickly
observed, and students believe they learn better. Such preferences are probably also held by some therapists and their clients, indeed by the culture at large. Media emphasize ways of
making learning easy and fun. Unfortunately, students often
forget what they have learned in college classes once the test
has been taken, and anxious or depressed individuals easily
revert to well-practiced biases outside the therapeutic context.
Therefore, the search for desirable difficulties in CBM research
is worthwhile.
In addition to distributed practice, other desirable difficulties identified by applied memory research include the initial
generation of the information to be remembered, in comparison to merely reading it (Bjork, 1994). As we have discussed
previously, this procedure likely works because it is transfer
appropriate to the demands of the “test.” (Transfer-inappropriate difficulty is undesirable.) A very similar prescription is to
take advantage of the testing effect (Roediger & Karpicke,
2006); a series of tests promotes better performance on a final
test, compared with a series of reexposures to the to-beremembered materials. Similarly, in clinical situations, therapists sometimes try to simulate stressful distractions of real
life so that clients can practice the prescribed coping under
difficult conditions. Establishing variable conditions during
practice is also a desirable difficulty, because variable conditions promote good performance in new situations (see Bjork,
1994; McDaniel & Callender, 2010). Anxious and depressed
individuals are faced with a variety of ambiguous situations in
real life. When one is not sure what conditions will hold during real-life tests, the wise course is to vary conditions during
training to optimize transfer (e.g., Mackintosh et al., 2006).
In summary, the main criteria regarding cognitive procedures to be used in modifying cognitive biases are their compatibility with those occurring during the challenges that life
presents and their tendency to promote changes in the long
term. These are also the lessons learned from much older traditions of associative learning.

With roots in the infancy of experimental psychology, contemporary learning theory provides useful perspectives on the etiology and maintenance of emotional disorders, anxiety
disorders in particular (see Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Fearrelated Pavlovian or operant contingencies are established
through direct or vicarious conditioning and aided by human
tendencies to be evolutionarily prepared for them. Any attempt
to change emotional reactions therefore should be understandable in terms of basic principles of associative learning, such
as extinction and counterconditioning. It is important to note
that these methods of behavior change do not cause unlearning
of the fear contingencies but instead establish new contingencies that strongly rely on their context (Bouton, 2000). Lapse
and relapse, in which the original contingencies dominate to
guide behavior, tend to occur if features of the context revert
to earlier conditions (the renewal effect) or if the original significant outcomes occur noncontingently (reinstatement).
Spontaneous recovery of the original response is also likely to
occur when fear-evoking cues are presented following a period
of time subsequent to extinction or counterconditioning trials
(i.e., following time after therapy sessions have ended).
Do similar dangers of lapse and relapse of old habits
characterize CBM procedures? In interpretation retraining,
contingencies between ambiguous situations and their preexperimental resolutions are, in effect, counterconditioned. Consider anxious participants, for whom the signal is an ambiguous
situation harboring the possibility of threat; the original significant outcome (the unconditioned stimulus) is the threatening resolution, and the new outcome is a benign resolution.
Bouton (2000) actually described the signal in typical extinction or counterconditioning paradigms as having two possible
meanings, one old and one new; the current meaning of the
ambiguous signal is determined by the exteroceptive, interoceptive, or temporal context. At first, when the context is
changed in the animal laboratory (e.g., from one apparatus to
the next), behavior generalizes (or in theoretical terms, the
expectancy of the original outcome holds), much like when
human participants begin a series of training trials and reveal
their typical resolutions of ambiguity, trained by real life. Then
counterconditioning trials ensue, and we can understand them
from a Pavlovian perspective of an ambiguous (negative or
positive) cue predicting the targeted positive resolution. (See
Clerkin & Teachman, 2010, for a similar application of conditioning principles to CBM.) Alternatively, from an operant
perspective, an ambiguous cue can set the occasion for the
reinforcement of target resolutions. Most forms of CBM
include reinforcement of some kind, in that tasks are designed
to reward the desired response (e.g., attending to a benign
stimulus or meaning), either because doing so makes performance easier and more fluent or because overt feedback is
provided (e.g., a “correct” signal). As we also learn from
research on desirable difficulties, variable conditions of
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training promote transfer beyond the conditioning episodes, as
do temporally spaced training sessions (Bjork, 1994; Bouton,
2000).
If the results from animal conditioning experiments apply
to CBM paradigms, however, signals presented in contexts
that differ from the CBM context should lead to robust renewal
of the initial response, and occasional experiences with negative events should reinstate it. In part, renewal, reinstatement,
and spontaneous recovery might be responsible for occasional
difficulties in finding evidence of far transfer after CBM.
Researchers with interests in therapeutic applications have
tried to overcome that difficulty in ways that are consistent
with Bouton’s (2000) analysis. One method is to promote
retrieval of the context for new learning—the training phase.
Methods for reminding participants about training experiences
as they encounter adverse events should enhance the chance of
generalization or transfer, as should the use of ecologically relevant episodes during training. In related investigations of
exposure therapy with phobic participants, instructions to
think back to the therapy session during behavioral testing
were found to improve transfer to a new context (Mystkowski,
Craske, Echiverri, & Labus, 2006). Reminders can also be
offered by others; in one anecdote reported by Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, and Mackintosh (2011) after an anxious
patient described his CBM session to his wife, she began saying “beep” (the error signal) to him whenever she saw him
begin worrying.
In short, the literatures concerning conditioning and memory principles converge in ways that are relevant to treatment
with CBM. Applications of CBM should include methods for
overcoming renewal, reinstatement, and spontaneous recovery
of the preexperimental bias. For example, the foregoing discussion suggests that training should incorporate situational
cues that typically provoke the deployment of negative biases
in real life. Subsequent encounters with such real events
should then provide automatic reminders of the newly acquired
adaptive response. More generally, awareness of this analogy
between CBM and conditioning paradigms reminds us about
the values inherent in functional or behavioral approaches to
understanding what we commonly consider to be mental phenomena (see De Houwer, 2011).

Considerations of automaticity versus
cognitive control
Although we have recommended the use of research on desirable difficulties as a model for how to achieve transfer in the
modification of cognitive biases, we acknowledge that experiments concerning desirable difficulties largely involve situations in which individuals explicitly attempt to remember, and
CBM transfer tasks usually do not use explicit instructions to
think back to training. Alternatively, the analogy to conditioning paradigms promotes the idea that change is achieved
implicitly through the modification of cognitive habits, without conscious reference to the training phase. In attempting to
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define CBM paradigms, for example, Koster et al. (2009, p. 3)
suggested that “[c]ommonly, it has been the case that the targeted bias represents a pattern of processing selectivity that
appears to operate automatically, in the sense of proceeding
swiftly without intention, and so is not readily amenable to
volitional control.” However, just as memory tests are not
“process pure” (Jacoby, 1991), training sessions likely operate
in habitual ways to influence current attention and interpretation but also consciously come to mind in a recollective sense.
In fact, participants sometimes report consciously thinking
back to specific training scenarios as they perform real-life
transfer tasks (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010). Similarly, training
can be more effective following explicit instructions about the
contingency between cues and targets (Krebs, Hirsch, &
Mathews, 2010). On the other hand, postexperimental interviews usually fail to reveal awareness of the training manipulation in the sense that participants later deny seeing any causal
connection between the training procedure and their own later
reactions in challenging situations (e.g., Amir, Beard, Taylor,
et al., 2009; Hirsch et al., 2009). These reports of lack of
awareness might be more convincing if we could rely on the
accuracy of self-reports about recollection during transfer that
are made subsequently, but self-reports about cognitive procedures are usually not reliable. In short, an important direction
for bias-modification research is the exploration of the extent
to which training experiences establish new habits or provide
the basis for controlled recollection, as well as the contexts
under which automatic or controlled processes dominate in
producing good transfer.
What do we know about the involvement of controlled procedures in training paradigms? First, practice in deliberately
suppressing (i.e., controlling “against”) the retrieval of learned
negative responses clearly impairs later deliberate recall, particularly when thought substitutes are used to help participants
not think about the target words to be suppressed (Joormann et
al., 2009). This is a finding that challenges popular assumptions about the inevitability of rebound following attempts at
thought suppression. The success of suppression-induced forgetting, replicated in many experiments using the think/nothink paradigm (see Anderson & Huddleston, in press), likely
results from the many trials of practicing suppression in
response to specific cues, whereas other methods offer less
well-controlled and repetitive means.
Deliberate recall has also been instructed during the transfer phase of a more typical paradigm for interpretation training
(Hertel et al., in press). Participants were instructed to complete some transfer scenarios in the same way as they had
completed contextually similar prior scenarios and to complete others differently. For example, if a training scenario
described being on a plane to Florida, the analogous transfer
scenario might describe being on a plane to Spain. When
instructed to respond as before, the correct response to the
transfer scenario was to complete it in the same way (i.e.,
benign or negative) as the related original or in the converse
manner if instructed to respond differently. Estimates of
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controlled recollection were calculated as the difference
between the proportion of correct completions under instructions to respond in the same way and the proportion of incorrect completions under instructions to respond differently (see
Jacoby, 1991). The main finding was that benign training proactively interfered with the controlled recollection of negative
interpretations. This finding does not demonstrate trainingcongruent facilitation of control, because it represents deficient recollection of test scenarios previously resolved in a
training-incongruent manner, not enhanced recollection for
those resolved in the trained direction. The lack of facilitation
might reflect what we learned from research on spontaneous
transfer in problem solving—that problem-oriented training
does not provide the best transfer to a memory-oriented test
phase (Needham & Begg, 1991). The process-dissociation
experiments (Hertel et al., in press) also failed to find evidence
for effects of training on automatic components of transfer, but
this outcome should be interpreted in light of the fact that
CBM transfer tasks do not usually call attention to the connections between training and transfer, as is required by processdissociation procedures at test. Other methods of assessing
automatic influences might tell a different story about automatic components of transfer.
As yet there has been little neuroimaging research that
could cast light on the contribution of cognitive control to bias
modification. Evidence for greater activation of the lateral
frontal cortex during test trials that required attention to be
directed differently from that previously practiced was taken
as evidence that such activation mediates training effects
(Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010).
Because the lateral frontal cortex is implicated in intentional
control, this finding might argue against exclusively automatic
effects. However, the effect was observed during violations of
the trained rule during test trials (i.e., when target detection
required attention to the alternate location to that induced during training), so it may be that intentional control is implemented only when participants have to voluntarily override
the practiced responses. A prediction that remains to be tested
is whether a similar pattern of activation during training that
counteracts preexperimental bias would decrease toward the
end of the training trials and thereby constitutes evidence for a
newly trained habit.
In summary, despite the apparent importance of this issue,
it is simply too soon to know to what extent and in what ways
controlled and automatic processes are involved in CBM. Resolution will require care in specifying the sense in which procedures should be conceived as controlled or automatic (see
Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Clearly, experimental control of
practice is ultimately responsible for transfer effects in CBM,
so the issues concern the degree to which and manner in which
individuals’ use of self-initiated conflict resolution or deliberate search processes (frontally mediated procedures) characterizes, benefits, or impairs transfer and whether those effects
are restricted to initial stages of bias modification. The extreme
position that performance on near- or far-transfer tasks is
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intentionally made to be consistent with training is refuted by
participants’ denial of connections between training and transfer tasks. Moreover, awareness of connections to the past can
be epiphenomenal to essentially automatic responding. As in
learning a new motor skill like riding a bicycle or hitting a tennis ball, performance can come under the control of practice
without any awareness of the underlying automatic components that must be recruited or inhibited. If CBM is similar to
motor learning in this respect, then fundamental processes
influencing ease of access to emotional meanings may be
modified during practice, yet produce changes that are typically attributed to controlled operations such as the intent to
reinterpret. In short, people do not always judge the cause of
their actions accurately, even while experiencing intent.

Relation to Other Research on Cognition–
Emotion Interactions
In this section, we compare the procedures and outcomes of
CBM experiments to those found in other research traditions
concerned with cognition and emotion interactions. In some
cases, the understanding of CBM findings can be informed by
reference to more established research domains, but in other
cases we argue that CBM methods offer more nuanced tools
that can be used to research questions relevant to these other
areas.

Mood and cognition
CBM experiments are not the first experiments on affect and
cognition to examine the direction of cause. Various methods
associated with other research traditions have sought to establish emotion as both the cause and effect of thoughts and memories (see Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Like CBM research, some
of this research has focused on emotional states that result
from particular styles of thinking. For example, the manipulation of ruminative versus distracting thoughts has produced
changes in depressed mood (e.g., Fennell & Teasdale, 1984;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Manipulations of rumination, although not devised for the purpose of establishing or
eliminating specific cognitive biases, are quite similar to CBM
manipulations in that they also have been shown to produce
changes in performance on subsequent cognitive tasks, some
of which are good examples of far transfer (e.g., Hertel & ElMessidi, 2006; Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Lyubomirsky,
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).
The opposite direction of causality in cognition–emotion
interactions has served as the focus of a much larger literature
on the effects of mood manipulations. Among other ways,
mood ostensibly has been manipulated through hypnosis, self
statements, success or failure, films, pictures, and music (see
Parrott & Hertel, 1999), and consequences for performance on
tests of attention, judgment, and memory have been examined.
In our view, many of these experiments are also similar to
CBM experiments, because the manipulations are essentially

531

Hertel and Mathews
cognitive. They are viewed as mood manipulations primarily
because researchers perform manipulation checks to determine if mood has been changed in the expected directions, but
the causal status of mood is typically not established. The classic example is the ubiquitous Velten mood-induction procedure (Velten, 1968), in which participants read and think about
a series of statements about oneself or the world that are emotionally positive, neutral, or negative. This manipulation
overtly changes the nature of thoughts in ways that have subsequent cognitive and self-reported emotional consequences,
much as bias training transfers to other cognitive tasks and
affects subsequent emotional reactions.
In all traditions (CBM and earlier cognition–emotion
experiments), we cannot always be certain that the direction of
cause conforms in simple ways to the focus of our manipulation. Manipulations of cognitive procedures might masquerade as mood manipulations or vice versa. Thoughts can have
immediate emotional consequences that in turn direct the
focus of other thoughts. Our inferences about cause are only as
tight as the experimental design permits. In that regard, however, it is important to note that several CBM experiments
have not produced changes in mood states immediately following training. In fact, although the scenario-based method
of interpretation training (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) can
lead to immediate mood changes, most other methods (involving interpretation or attention to single words) do not, as
assessed by self-rating or questionnaire measures (e.g., Hoppitt et al., 2010a, 2010b; MacLeod et al., 2002; Wilson et al.,
2006). Despite this lack of mood induction by training, differences in emotional vulnerability can still be revealed later, in
response to a potentially threatening or distressing event. Furthermore, a direct comparison between a traditional (musical)
mood induction and interpretation training showed that the
latter resulted in congruent changes on the scrambled sentence
test (Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003), but there were
no such changes on the same test following mood manipulation (Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010). Another experiment in
which direction of training and mood induction were independently manipulated showed that posttraining mood did not
modify responses to a subsequent transfer test to assess interpretation bias (Salemink & van den Hout, 2010). In short,
CBM cannot simply be seen as a variant on mood manipulations. Typically, mood manipulations do not systematically
guide attention or the interpretation of ambiguity, and they are
not designed to promote transfer to similar situations.
In a more general sense, cognitive bias manipulations differ
from previous manipulations in the specificity of their methods
and goals. The previous methods were designed to induce general cognitive or affective states (such as rumination or sadness)
believed to have general consequences (negative feelings or
memories) by virtue of some theoretical mechanism such as
activation in a semantic network (e.g., Bower, 1981). CBM
methods target specific cognitive procedures with the potential
to emerge in a variety of circumstances (such as attending to
a threatening thought or event or interpreting ambiguity in a

negative light) and that are practiced in ways that should transfer to similar new situations. In our view, the compatibility of
CBM with functional analyses derived from associative learning and transfer-appropriate-processing frameworks sidesteps
the global assumptions that characterized early research on cognition and emotion (also see MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009).

Appraisal theory
Appraisal theorists have long proposed that emotions arise from
a cognitive process in which individuals evaluate the personal
implications of an event, including their ability to control or
cope with it, and that variations in emotion depend primarily on
the outcome of this process (e.g., Roseman, 1991; Smith &
Lazarus, 1993). The CBM approach clearly shares the common
goal of investigating the assumed role played by cognitive processes in emotion, yet the methods of investigation differ.
Appraisal theories have generally been tested by showing that
the self-reported relevance of an event is a good predictor of
emotional response and not by modifying processes assumed to
contribute to appraisal but likely inaccessible to conscious
report, as in CBM experiments. Application of modification
methods might thus prove useful in testing tenets of appraisal
theory. Conversely, the extensive evidence of individual differences found in appraisal research should usefully inform future
CBM experiments.
An example of the first direction of possible cross-application is provided by Schartau, Dalgleish, and Dunn (2009), who
showed that practice in adopting a benign appraisal style during exposure to aversive pictures resulted in a later reduction
of negative emotion during the viewing of a video depicting
serious accidents. Further experiments would be required to
provide more precise information on the specific processes
underlying such instructed appraisal. Concerning the reverse
direction of application, it might be possible to understand
some failures to find far-transfer effects in CBM experiments
by considering individual differences in appraisals. For example, the absence of any benefit from training positive social
interpretations on later reactions to failing a cognitive test
(Salemink et al., 2007) might in retrospect be understood in
terms of the different appraisals associated with affiliative and
achievement concerns (Smith & Pope, 1992). Design of future
far-transfer experiments might thus profit from knowing about
the emotional consequences of variations in appraisal style
across individuals and events. Conversely, CBM methods
should provide a useful tool to test specific causal assumptions
of appraisal theory in a more analytic way.

Relation to Cognitive Behavior Therapy
CBM applications to clinical disorders overlap to some extent
with cognitive behavior therapy (CBT). Both involve direct
attempts to modify cognitive processes believed to underlie
emotional distress, and both employ systematic exposure to the
events that trigger distress. In CBT, exposure to evocative
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events is designed to reduce emotional reactions via extinction
(sometimes referred to as habituation) or to collect evidence
against false beliefs by showing that anticipated catastrophic
consequences do not occur. Indeed, it is often thought that
attempts to avoid accessing fear-evoking representations serve
to maintain anxiety, because stored emotional memories must
be fully activated before they can be changed (Foa & Kozak,
1986). This hypothesis sometimes leads clinicians to predict
that avoidance of attention to threats can worsen emotional
symptoms. In CBM, by contrast, extinction due to exposure is
not thought to be the agent of change; in fact, training and control conditions sometimes involve a similar extent of exposure
to potential threat cues. Instead, the critical difference between
training and control conditions is how such evocative events are
processed (i.e., whether potential threat cues are to be attended
or not, or how they are interpreted or recalled). The effectiveness of CBM thus suggests that fear-evoking events do not need
to be fully realized for change to occur, as some clinical
researchers have assumed, because training to avoid threats—in
favor of alternative meanings or events—can be beneficial. This
conclusion suggests possible alternative explanations for the
effectiveness of CBT, such as alterations in the relative ease of
retrieving positive versus negative emotional memories (see
Brewin, 2006). Direct empirical comparisons between CBT and
CBM perspectives on fear, investigating the extent to which
they have overlapping or differential effects, would thus constitute a worthwhile direction for future research.
To be sure, CBT also targets inappropriate cognitive content, but here the usual means of change is to directly challenge the reportable thoughts believed to maintain distress. In
contrast, CBM involves repeated trials that target processes
typically not available to conscious report, and as we have
argued earlier, participants are not necessarily aware of the
resultant changes. Nonetheless, as CBM moves into therapy
settings, this last distinction might become less pronounced,
with therapists giving their clients more explicit guidance
about what is required (Krebs et al., 2010). (In this regard, we
should consider the possibility that explicit instructions for
change might sidestep processes that promote longer lasting
effects.) Similarly, as CBT embraces the use of computer-controlled methods (Andrews, Cuijpers, Craske, McEvoy, &
Titov, 2010), possibilities for integration are likely to increase.

Conclusion
From the outset, CBM research has been motivated and guided
by hypotheses emerging from clinical research and practice,
such as hypotheses concerning the causal role for cognitive
processes in emotional disorders postulated by pioneers such
as Beck (1976). As in other experimental approaches, hypothesis testing has forced CBM researchers to be more precise
about putative causes when designing modification methods.
Causal hypotheses are then tested in what has become known
as experimental-psychopathology research, in which symptoms of disorders may be produced or reversed. One example
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is provided by the work cited earlier showing that changing
the style of thinking associated with rumination reduces
depressed mood (Watkins et al., 2009). In another example,
the hypothesis that depression is maintained by the tendency
to attribute negative outcomes to the self and positive outcomes elsewhere was confirmed by experimentally inducing
this attributional style in one group and the opposite style in
another (Peters, Constans, & Mathews, in press). CBM
research also allows the investigation of competing hypotheses, such as whether pathological worry is exacerbated by a
failure to disengage attention or by enhanced engagement with
threatening content (Hirsch et al., 2011). Thus, starting from
the general idea that the biases characteristic of emotional disorders may contribute to maintaining them, CBM researchers
develop methods for testing specific hypotheses about the
conditions under which cognitive processes exacerbate or
reduce emotional symptoms, and then the results of those tests
can be used to guide the development of new treatments.
Beyond strictly clinical concerns, research paradigms gathered together under the rubric of cognitive bias modification
are nothing more and nothing less than tools to test assumptions, often initially unspecified, about interactions between
cognitive and emotional processes. If we think we understand
a phenomenon, we design a procedure to simulate it with naive
individuals by bringing the putative processes under experimental control. Transfer-appropriate and contextually sensitive operations constitute basic rules of engagement. If we
understand it well enough, the phenomenon in question can be
not only simulated but also manipulated to produce changes in
mental and emotional well-being.
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